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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-REMOVING THE THIRD OP-
TION FROM THE JURY-State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 298
S.E.2d 645 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in State
v. Strickland,1 the rule governing second degree murder jury in-
structions in a first degree murder case was clear. In all murder
cases in which the prosecution relied on the elements of premedi-
tation and deliberation to prove that first degree murder had been
committed, the trial judge was required to submit the issue of sec-
ond degree murder to the jury. This rule came from the Court's
unanimous decision in State v. Harris.2 The Court adhered to this
rule in several later cases3 until it heard Strickland in 1983.
Apparently motivated by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Hopper v. Evans,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed its decision in Harris and held that a second degree mur-
der instruction is not mandated in every murder case in which pre-
meditation and deliberation are at issue. As a result of the Court's
holding in Strickland, such an instruction is now required only
when there is some evidence that the defendant did not act with
premeditation and deliberation. If there is no such evidence, the
trial judge is to exclude from jury consideration the option of find-
ing the defendant guilty of second degree murder.'
This note will examine the scope of the rule in general, and in
particular, the propriety of its application to the facts in
Strickland.
THE CASE
The defendant, Strickland, was convicted of two counts of kid-
napping and one count of first degree murder.' He appealed his
1. 307 N.C. 274, 298 S.E.2d 645 (1983).
2. 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424 (1976).
3. State v. Poole, 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E.2d 339 (1979); State v. Keller, 297
N.C. 674, 256 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
4. 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
5. 307 N.C. at 293, 298 S.E.2d at 658.
6. Id. at 276, 298 S.E.2d at 648.
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convictions on several grounds,' including the trial court's failure
to submit the question of his guilt of second degree murder to the
jury.8
The surviving victim and a co-defendant both testified that
Strickland and three other men pursued the victims in a car and
forced them at gunpoint into a car occupied by the four men. All
four men repeatedly raped the female victim. The male victim was
tied to a tree with a rope, and Strickland strangled him with a
shirt placed over his head and neck. Strickland also attempted to
kill the female victim by choking her, smothering her with his
hand and stomping on her neck. She was then left to die in a se-
cluded area but somehow survived and sought help. The four men
returned to Strickland's home after committing the crimes.9
Strickland testified that he was forced at gunpoint, by a co-
defendant, to participate in the crimes. He claimed that he had
attempted to aid both victims and to stop his co-defendants' vio-
lent acts. His wife also testified that she saw one of the co-defen-
dants pointing a gun at the defendant in their home.' 0
On appeal, Strickland assigned as error the trial judge's failure
to instruct the jury on a charge of second degree murder. He con-
tended that based on prior decisions of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, a trial court judge must instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of second degree murder when the prosecu-
tion relies upon the elements of deliberation and premeditation to
establish that first degree murder had been committed."'
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Strickland's con-
viction of first degree murder and ordered a new trial on the kid-
napping charges.' 2 The Court rejected Strickland's contention that
a second degree murder instruction must be given in every case in
which the prosecution alleges that. a murder was committed with
deliberation and premeditation.
7. Strickland also assigned as error the trial judge's failure to require the jury
to find that he had acted with malice in order to convict him of murder, the
court's error in its instruction on duress as a defense to the kidnapping charges,
the court's failure to require that the jury find that Strickalnd had acted unlaw-
fully in order to convict him of kidnapping and the court's denial of his request
for a voir dire examination prior to the admission of an inculpatory statement.
8. 307 N.C. at 277, 298 S.E.2d at 648.
9. Id. at 277-79, 298 S.E.2d at 649-50.
10. Id. at 279, 298 S.E.2d at 650.
11. Id. at 281, 298 S.E.2d at 651.
12. Id. at 277, 298 S.E.2d at 648-49.
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BACKGROUND
The case law in North Carolina on this point has developed
step-by-step. With each case, the North Carolina Supreme Court
edged closer toward an absolute requirement of a second degree
murder instruction in all first degree murder cases prosecuted on
the theory of premeditation and deliberation. The Court finally ar-
rived at that point with its decision in State v. Harris but has now
retreated from it with its decision in Strickland. An early case in
North Carolina which began to define the law in this area is State
v. Spivey."3 The defendant, Spivey, was convicted of the first de-
gree murder of his father-in-law. He appealed his conviction on the
ground that the trial judge had committed reversible error by re-
fusing to instruct the jury on second degree murder." The North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld his conviction and stated that he
was not entitled to a second degree murder instruction because the
murder was committed by the defendant while lying in wait and
during an attempt to commit arson.1 5 According to the Court,
when the evidence discloses a method of killing which by statute is
per se murder in the first degree, the defendant's premeditation
and deliberation are presumed, and a second degree murder in-
struction is improper. 6 The Court also stated in dicta that if there
is any evidence, or if any inference can be reasonably made from
the evidence, which tends to show a lower grade of murder, it is
then the duty of the trial judge to submit that view to the jury.'7
State v. Newsome, 18 a 1928 case, further defined the law in
this area. In that case, the evidence tended to establish that the
defendant had killed his victim during an attempted rape or with
premeditation and deliberation. Again, the trial judge did not in-
struct the jury on second degree murder. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that his failure to do so was reversible error and
ordered a new trial.19
The opinion in Newsome contained strong language to the ef-
fect that the elements of premeditation and deliberation are al-
ways matters of fact to be determined by a jury, not matters of law
13. 151 N.C. 676, 65 S.E. 995 (1909).
14. Id. at 683, 65 S.E. at 998.
15. Id. at 687, 65 S.E. at 1000.
16. Id. at 684-85, 65 S.E. at 999.
17. Id. at 685-86, 65 S.E. at 999.
18. 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928).
19. Id. at 564, 143 S.E. at 193.
1984]
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to be determined by a judge. 0 The Court added that if premedita-
tion and deliberation are relied upon by the State as constituting
the crime of first degree murder, those elements must be proved by
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt.2" It is for the jury, not
the judge, to decide if such a reasonable doubt exists.22
The Court continued to follow its trend of requiring second
degree murder instructions in first degree murder cases in State v.
Perry.23 The defendant in Perry was convicted of first degree mur-
der and sentenced to die. No eyewitnesses to the homicide testi-
fied, and all the evidence against the defendant was
circumstantial.2 4
Once more, the Court held that the judge had erred by not
submitting a second degree murder instruction to the jury. 3 The
Court cited its holdings in Spivey and Newsome to support its de-
cision granting the defendant a new trial.26
With these decisions, the Court appeared to be leaning toward
an absolute requirement of a second degree murder instruction in
murder cases which are prosecuted on the theory of premeditation
and deliberation. Indeed, this is exactly what the Court held in
State v. Harris.2 7 This rule was then followed in State v. Keller"
and State v. Poole 2 and was the law in North Carolina until State
v. Strickland.
In Keller, the North Carolina Supreme Court firmly adopted
the rule set out in Harris. While the Court conceded that the rule
in first degree murder cases with regard to second degree murder
instructions differed from the general rule on lesser included of-
fenses, the Court stated that the Harris rule was firmly rooted in
case law in North Carolina.30 Generally, a trial court judge evalu-
ates the evidence and must only instruct the jury on a lesser in-
20. "Premeditation and deliberation are always matters of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury, and not matters of law to be determined by the judge." 195
N.C. at 564, 143 S.E. at 193.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 209 N.C. 604, 184 S.E. 545 (1936).
24. Id. at 605, 184 S.E. at 546.
25. Id. at 606, 184 S.E. at 546.
26. Id. at 606, 184 S.E. at 546.
27. 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424.
28. 297 N.C. 674, 256 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
29. 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E.2d 339 (1979).
30. 297 N.C. at 677, 256 S.E.2d at 713.
[Vol. 7:89
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cluded offense if he finds evidence of that lesser included offense.3"
The Court also emphasized the importance of predictability by the
courts as a justification for reaffirming the Harris rule. 2
The facts in Keller are somewhat similar to those in Strick-
land. Keller and an accomplice forced the murder victim into a
van and took him to a secluded area. Keller shot, but did not suc-
ceed in killing, the victim. At Keller's direction, his accomplice also
shot the victim several times. The men then drove to a carwash to
dispose of the body but discovered that the man was still alive.
They then slashed his throat with a knife and killed him."
At trial, Keller offered no evidence in his defense, and the trial
court judge instructed the jury to find the defendant either guilty
or not guilty of first degree murder. 4
The Court's primary reason for following Harris in this case
was to provide a consistent approach to first degree murder cases
prosecuted on the theory of premeditation and deliberation." The
Court also stated that the elements of premeditation and delibera-
tion must usually be inferred from circumstantial evidence.3 6 Ac-
cording to the court, in first degree murder cases it is the jury
which must choose to draw or not draw such an inference.3 There
were no dissenting opinions in Keller.
In Poole, the Court again followed the Harris rule. The Court
simply reaffirmed its decision in Harris without elaborating upon
its reasons for doing so.8 There was only one dissenting opinion in
Poole. Justice Huskins stated that he no longer supported the ab-
solute requirement of a second degree murder instruction in first
degree murder cases.39 He indicated a preference for such an in-
struction only when there is evidence to support the lesser in-
cluded offense.40 This is essentially the rule adopted by the Court
in Strickland.
31. State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 65, 212 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1975); State v.
Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 22, 203 S.E.2d 10, 24 (1974).
32. 297 N.C. at 678, 256 S.E.2d at 713.
33. Id. at 675-76, 256 S.E.2d at 711-12.
34. Id. at 676, 256 S.E.2d at 712.
35. Id. at 677, 256 S.E.2d at 713.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 677-78, 256 S.E.2d at 713.
38. 298 N.C. at 258, 258 S.E.2d at 342.
39. Id. at 260, 258 S.E.2d at 343.
40. Id. Justice Huskins had retired from the North Carolina Supreme Court
when it considered the Strickland case.
1984]
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ANALYSIS
The North Carolina first degree murder statute separates the
crime into four classes. They are:
I. Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, impris-
onment, starving or torture;
II. Murder perpetrated by any other kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing;
III. Murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpe-
tration of certain enumerated felonies;
IV. Murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of any other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon."1
In cases in which a homicide is perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving or torture, the law
conclusively presumes that the murder was committed with pre-
meditation and deliberation. 2 In such cases, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has consistently held that a trial court is not re-
quired to instruct the jury on second degree murder.48 This is also
the rule in cases in which the evidence tends to show that a mur-
der was committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of a felony." However, if the State prosecutes a case on the
theory that the murder was committed with premeditation and de-
liberation, it has the burden of proving these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.'5 If the State can prove that an unlawful killing
of a human being occurred, but cannot prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted with premeditation and delibera-
tion, the defendant is guilty of second degree, rather than first de-
gree murder.46
The issue addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Strickland was this: when must a trial judge instruct the jury on
second degree murder if the defendant is charged with the first
degree murder? As noted before, the rule in North Carolina from
1976 until the Court's 1983 decision in Strickland left no room for
doubt. A defendant prosecuted for first degree murder on the the-
ory that he had acted with premeditation and deliberation was en-
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981).
42. 307 N.C. at 282, 298 S.E.2d at 652.
43. 151 N.C. 676, 65 S.E. 995.
44. 209 N.C. at 605, 184 S.E. at 546.
45. Id. at 606, 184 S.E. at 546.
46. State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 458, 128 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1963).
[Vol. 7:89
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss1/5
JURY'S OPTION
titled to a second degree murder instruction to the jury in every
case. There was no need for the trial judge to determine whether
there was evidence tending to support a conviction of second de-
gree murder.
In 1983, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court aban-
doned its unanimous holding to that effect in Harris, even though
it had explicitly adhered to the rule in Poole and Keller. The moti-
vation behind the Court's revision of the law in this area seems to
lie with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hopper v.
Evans.47 The majority in Strickland repeatedly cited Hopper as
authority for its change of position. 8
In Hopper, the Court held that no jury instructions on lesser
included offenses are required in a capital case in which the defen-
dant's own evidence affirmatively negates the possibility that such
an instruction might have been warranted. 49 However, the majority
in Strickland read the opinion to mean that it eradicated the rule
in Harris. It is in this respect that the holding in Strickland in
incorrect and overly broad.
A better interpretation of Hopper is that found in Justice
Carlton's dissenting opinion in Strickland. He argues that the rule
in Hopper carves out only a narrow exception to the Harris rule.
His interpretation is that it is only when the defendant's own evi-
dence affirmatively establishes the elements of premeditation and
deliberation that the jury should not be instructed on second de-
gree murder.50 The key to this analysis lies in the fact that the
Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding in Hopper to the facts
of that case.51
The facts in Hopper differ significantly from those in Strick-
land. The defendant in Hopper made a full confession in which he
stated that he had intended to kill his victim and that he would
kill again under similar circumstances. He indicated that he felt no
remorse.5 2 Strickland, however, denied that he had committed a
murder with premeditation and deliberation. He did not make a
confession of an intent to kill but instead testified that he was
forced at gunpoint to participate in the crime. There was also testi-
mony given by his wife tending to support his story. In Strickland,
47. 307 N.C. at 288-90, 298 S.E.2d at 655-56.
48. 307 N.C. at 285, 288-90, 298 S.E.2d at 653, 655-56.
49. 456 U.S. at 606.
50. 307 N.C. at 313, 298 S.E.2d at 669.
51. 456 U.S. at 612.
52. Id. at 607.
19841
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the defendant provided no evidence which affirmatively negated
the possibility that he was guilty of a lesser offense.5" In fact, if
given the option of convicting Strickland of second degree murder,
the jury might have reasonably inferred from the evidence that he
had not acted with deliberation and premeditation.
In general, questions of premeditation and deliberation have
been left almost entirely to juries and not to judges. Our criminal
justice system recognizes that panels of lay-persons are best quali-
fied to determine the state of mind of a defendant when he com-
mitted a crime. The jury is the ultimate fact finder, and its mem-
bers are responsible for determining the credibility of witnesses.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has frequently stated that pre-
meditation and deliberation are always matters of fact to be deter-
mined by a jury and not matters of law to be determined by a
judge."' However, because of the rule established in Strickland,
judges, rather than jurors, will now have the initial responsibility
of determining whether a defendant has killed with premeditation
and deliberation. If a trial judge finds that there is not evidence
from which he can infer that the defendant did not deliberate and
premeditate his crime, he must show exclude the possibility of con-
viction of second degree murder from the jury. With this rule, the
Court has created the real possibility that a jury may not have the
third option of finding a defendant guilty of second degree murder
when that may be the best verdict.
There is, of course, the argument that the Strickland decision
merely conforms the rule in first degree murder cases to the rule in
all other criminal cases with regard to submitting instructions on
lesser included offenses to a jury.55 Generally, in other types of
criminal cases a trial judge is not required to submit the question
of the defendant's guilt of a lesser included offense to the jury
when there is no evidence to sustain a verdict of the defendant's
guilt of a lesser offense. 5"
While there is logic in this argument, it must be remembered
that conviction of first degree murder in North Carolina carries
with it a sentence of death or life imprisonment. 7 It is better in
this instance to let the jury alone act as a fact finder and to allow it
53. 307 N.C. at 312, 298 S.E.2d at 668.
54. 195 N.C. at 564, 143 S.E. at 193. See also State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674,
256 S.E.2d 710 (1979); State v. Stewart, 226 N.C. 299, 38 S.E.2d 29 (1946).
55. 307 N.C. at 303, 297 S.E.2d at 664.
56. State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 338, 289 S.E.2d 325, 331-32 (1982).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981).
[Vol. 7:89
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to have the third option rather than limiting its choices to guilty or
not guilty of first degree murder. With such high stakes involved, it
is essential to protect defendants' rights by allowing the jury a full
range of options if there is even a remote possibility that the de-
fendant did not act with premeditation and deliberation.
Additionally, as Justice Carlton points out in his dissent,
under the Court's decision in Strickland, trial judges are left with
no real guidance from the Court in determining when a second de-
gree murder charge is to be submitted to the jury18 If the rule
suggested by Justice Carlton were adopted, judges would have a
definite standard to guide them-they would submit the issue of
second degree murder to the jury unless the defendant's own evi-
dence affirmatively established the elements of premeditation and
deliberation.
Had the Court wanted to revise its holding in Harris to make
it consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Hopper, it would have been more appropriate to create the new
rule in a case with a different fact situation. The North Carolina
Supreme court stretched the limited Hopper rule too far and suc-
ceeded in creating a new rule which leaves judges without any real
help in determining when a second degree murder instruction is to
be submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court significantly altered the
law in North Carolina regarding second degree murder instructions
with its decision in State v. Strickland. The rule now is this-a
trial judge is responsible for determining whether there is any evi-
dence tending to show that defendant did not act with premedita-
tion and deliberation when committing a murder. If the judge finds
that there is no such evidence, he is to exclude from the jury's con-
sideration the option of a second degree murder verdict.
Lisa Boutelle Hardin
58. 307 N.C. at 320, 298 S.E.2d at 673.
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